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I. INTRODUCTION TO COLLABORATIVE LAWYERING
Reputation, reputation, reputation! 0! I have lost my reputation. I have
lost the immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial. 1
When Branch Rickey was about to hire Jackie Robinson as the first
African-American baseball player in major league baseball, Rickey and
Brooklyn Dodgers scout and manager Clyde Sukeforth spent an afternoon
with Robinson explaining to him how very difficult it was going to be for
him to play second base for the Brooklyn Dodgers. 2 Rickey told Robinson
that he would be reviled, taunted, and insulted by the vilest racial epithets
imaginable; that players and fans alike would try to drive him out of the
league; that he would be spat upon, spiked by opposing players, and hit by
opposing pitchers.3 But Rickey made Robinson promise that he would never
retaliate. Robinson responded by saying that he would have thought that
Rickey would want a player who's not afraid to fight back.4 No, replied
Rickey, "I want a ballplayer with guts enough not to fight back!"5
This vignette is analogous to the difficulty in convincing today's
litigating attorney that fighting back is not always a sign of strength, that it
can in fact be a sign of inflexibility and harm the client's interests. A growing
coterie of lawyers is stepping off from that presumption, and discovering that
it is possible to take mediation advocacy a step further, by generally
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1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act 2, sc. 3.
2 ARTHUR MANN, THE JACKIE ROBINSON STORY 110 (1950).
3Id.
4 Id. at 111.
5Id.
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eliminating the need for a mediator through an innovative dispute resolution
method known as "collaborative lawyering." The collaborative lawyering
process has been developed by the Collaborative Law Center in Cincinnati,
Ohio (CLC) and couples the problem solving and interest-based negotiation
principles of mediation with an added commitment by the parties to
settlement.6 This novel approach can be summarized succinctly as
"representation for settlement purposes only" or "advocacy without
litigation."
The heart of the collaborative lawyering process is the Participation
Agreement, which each lawyer and client must sign at the outset of
negotiations. In the Participation Agreement, the parties agree that each
attorney's representation in the pending matter will be for settlement
purposes only and that the parties can proceed to litigation only if they obtain
new counsel. By contracting away their right to continue their respective
relationships into litigation, both the attorneys and clients have increased the
stakes in the negotiation process and make a real commitment to settlement.
This increased incentive to achieve settlement is what sets collaborative
lawyering apart from mediation.
The CLC is a group of 115 to 130 lawyers, from practices as diverse as
large firms, corporate staff counsel, and solo practitioners, who are
committed to finding non-adversarial alternatives to litigation and have
signed the Application for Inclusion on Practice Roster.7 The CLC was
founded in 1998, and is headed by its co-founder and president Robert W.
Rack, Jr., Chief Circuit Mediator for the United States Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Bea V. Larsen, a matrimonial attorney in Cincinnati, is the other co-
founder and CLC's vice-president and treasurer. Ms. Larsen also heads a
subgroup of the Family Law Project, which applies the principles of
collaborative lawyering to resolve matrimonial disputes.
Collaborative lawyering is especially well suited to the domestic
relations context,8 in which children are often in the middle of the dispute,
6 CLC is located at 8 West Ninth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202. For additional
information or for a list of collaborative lawyers, telephone 513-956-0795, facsimile 513-
721-3383, or at http//:www.collaborativelaw.com.
7 Approximately seventy more lawyers have completed collaborative law training
but have not yet signed the Application for Inclusion on General Practice Roster (General
Legal Matters).
8 Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: What It Is and Why Family Law Attorneys
Need to Know About It, 13 AM. J. FAM. L. 215, 221 (1999); see also D. Todd Sholar,
Note, Collaborative Law-A Method for the Madness, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 667, 675-
81 (1993) (one of the early journal notes to examine the use of collaborative law in
domestic relations practice and to acknowledge the presence of ethical considerations in
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and where the two parties wish to create and maintain a working relationship
after the dispute is settled. However, other practice areas can also benefit
from collaborative lawyering, and it is being practiced within the labor and
employment bar. An employee may have a legitimate dispute with her
employer, but she does not want to quit her job or create tension between
herself and her employer. Similarly, the employer may have a desire to retain
the employee if the narrow dispute can be resolved. Collaborative lawyering,
in which the attorneys agree not to sue or threaten to sue, can help to achieve
those goals.
The collaborative lawyering approach creates much less tension than
other forms of conflict resolution because the possibility of litigation is
entirely removed from the process and a meaningful commitment to
settlement has already been made by the parties because they have signed the
Participation Agreement. While critics may suggest that collaborative
lawyers may agree upon a less desirable settlement simply to avoid having
the process fail and foreclosing their ability to obtain attorney fees,
proponents respond that the process itself creates an incentive to seek a better
outcome for the client. Collaborative lawyering may not been seen as
litigator-friendly; it will, however, prove to be client-friendly, and lawyers
who are problem-solvers will better serve those clients.
Part II of this Article outlines the nuts and bolts of the collaborative
lawyering process and reviews the Participation Agreement in more detail.
Part III discusses the unique ethical considerations in the practice of
collaborative lawyering and ethical issues that must still be settled. Finally,
Part IV challenges tomorrow's lawyers to do a better job of incorporating
collaborative processes into the every day practice of law and the creative
resolution of disputes.
II. NUTS AND BOLTS OF COLLABORATiVE LAW
Comparing the collaborative lawyer's commitment to the settlement
process to that of the litigator is like comparing the pig's commitment to his
fanner's breakfast to that of the chicken, who survives to lay another egg.
Through the Participation Agreement, collaborative lawyering begins by
making clear to the practitioner and the client that there is no reward for
failure once the process has begun.9 If the collaborative law approach fails,
the collaborative lawyer's zealous representation of his client and the potential for having
to withdraw from employment).
9 For a comprehensive exposition and defense of the cooperative strategy
anticipating collaborative lawyering, see ROBERT H. MNOOKiN, ET.AL., BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING To CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DIsPUTES 319 (2000); Ronald
J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict
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the client must find new counsel at a new lawfirm to file or recommence the
litigation. Having to find new counsel at a new firm if the process breaks
down provides the client additional incentive to find the kinds of creative
solutions necessary for a collaborative result. And, of course, the prospect of
losing the client provides an incentive to the lawyer to find a solution to the
dispute.
10
Removing the possibility of going to trial at the outset of the process is a
powerful architectonic way of changing the mindset of both the client and the
attorney. Unlike mediation, where the attorney-client relationship will
continue if the mediation fails, collaborative lawyering requires both
attorneys to sign a non-litigation agreement from the outset. This helps the
attorney to better, and more quickly, determine the real interests of his client.
In addition, it forces the client to take a more positive approach to the
possibility that the other side has a rational, legitimate interest in a mutual
gains solution. As a result, both sides are able to see the process as a mutual
gains experience, because they are working together, not independently, to
find a solution.
Collaborative lawyering encourages four-way conferences, so that both
clients and both attorneys can work collaboratively to identify their own
interests, and legitimatize the interests of the other side. Moreover, in
collaborative lawyering, the probability that one side will threaten to "take
the matter to court" is substantially lessened because of the cost that would
result to both attorney and client.
The Participation Agreement governs the entire process. The
Participation Agreement includes rules for discovery and, where necessary,
joint court orders on such matters as staying pending litigation during the
collaborative law settlement process.
11
Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 513, 528, 551-54 (1994). See
also id. at 535 ("[I]n order for lawyers to allow clients credibly to precommit to a
cooperative solution the payoffs in the lawsuit must take the form of a prisoner's
dilemma: mutual cooperation must have a bigger payoff for each player than mutual
defection.").
10 The Participation Agreement does make an exception for in-house counsel.
In-house counsel may continue to represent the corporate client, but the corporation
agrees to secure different lead trial counsel if litigation ensues after the breakdown of the
collaborative lawyering process. Respected members of the plaintiffs bar have accepted
this apparent disparity of treatment provided plaintiff's counsel trusts in-house counsel
not to abuse the exception by designing a failure of the process and the necessary
elimination of the other side's attorney and firm from the case. See discussion infra Part
III.B.
11 See, e.g., The Joint Motion To: (1) Stay This Case For - Days Pending the
Parties' Collaborative Efforts to Settle Without Further Litigation; and (2) Denying All
Pending Motions As Moot Without Prejudice to Refile (approved by Chief Judge Walter
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A. Commitment to Training
Participation in collaborative lawyering brings a commitment to training.
Attorneys who are members of CLC must complete an initial program of
collaborative law training. The training incorporates basic interest-based
negotiation skills12 with role-playing exercises created by the Harvard
Negotiation Project under the leadership of Professors Roger Fisher and
currently Robert Mnookin. 13 To that framework, CLC adds discussions on
the purpose and application of the Participation Agreement, preparing the
client for collaborative negotiation and on ethical and professional
considerations for the practicing collaborative lawyer that are examined in
Part Ill of this Article. When an attorney who is a CLC member agrees to
participate in a collaborative law matter with a non-member attorney, the
non-member agrees to "complete such training as is required by CLC for
such non-member attorneys." 14
Membership in CLC and inclusion on the roster of collaborative lawyers
are determined only by completion of prescribed initial training and refresher
or advanced training, when scheduled, and execution of a Participation
Agreement.
H. Rice of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on February 22,
1999), available at http:llwww.ohsd.uscourts.gov/forms.htm. The judges of the Court of
Common Pleas for Hamilton County, Ohio adopted a similar Standing Order for cases
within their jurisdiction. Effective October 1, 2001, the Court under the leadership of
Judge Mark R. Schweikert and Judge Thomas C. Nurre approved an Entry adopting
Local Rule 43 (Provisional) "in recognition of the possible benefits of Collaborative Law
Settlement techniques and with the intention to examine and evaluate such efforts and
their applicability to the cases filed in [our Court] ... ." The Court also proposed a Joint
Motion to Treat Case Under Collaborative Law Rule with a Memorandum in Support and
an Order Granting Joint Motion to Treat Case Under Collaborative Law Rule. HAMILTON
COUNTY R. PRACTICE CT. C.P. 43, available at, http://www.courtclerk.org/comrule.htm.
Questions may be directed to Judge Schweikert via email at mschweik@cms.hamilton-
co.org.
1 2 See generally ROGER FISHER, FT. AL., GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991).
13 The framework for teaching negotiation skills is crisply distilled in PROGRAM ON
NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, NEGOTIATION PEDAGOGY: A RESEARCH
SURVEY OF FOUR DISCIPLINES (2000); see also BRUCE M. PATrON, ON TEACHING
NEGOTIATION, PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION WORKING PAPER 85-3 (1985); Bruce M.
Patton, Some Techniques For Teaching Negotiation to Large Groups, 11 NEGOTIATION J.
403 (1995); Gerald R. Williams & Joseph M. Geis, Negotiation Skills Training In The
Law School Curriculum, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 113 (1998).
1 4 COLLABORATIVE LAW PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT FOR GENERAL LEGAL
MATTERS 2 (COLLABORATIVE LAW CTR., INC., 1999) [hereinafter CLC PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT].
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B. Good Faith Questions and Answers
By signing the Participation Agreement, both parties to the dispute agree
to eschew formal discovery procedures, unless both parties later agree that
formal discovery is needed. Instead, they pledge to "provide good faith
responses to any good faith questions and requests."'15 The Participation
Agreement defines a good faith question as one that is "reasonably calculated
to assist in assessing the merits and/or value of the party's claim(s) or to
otherwise further the process of reaching a settlement of all issues." 16 It is
not inconceivable in this context that a collaborative lawyer might divulge
information that would not be discoverable in litigation or that the lawyer
might have wanted to avoid disclosing. If the information facilitates
movement toward a mutual gains solution to the problem, divulging it may
be wise for his client and therefore the attorney should attempt to gain his
client's consent.
17
For this reason, the Participation Agreement contains a confidentiality
clause. No information disclosed in the collaborative lawyering process may
later be disclosed in court if the process should break down. Experts or
consultants retained during the process may not, absent agreement,
participate in any subsequent litigation between the parties. The only
exception to this rule would be if the information would later be needed to
enforce an agreement or settlement reached through collaborative lawyering.
As in any settlement process, caution must be taken since some
information revealed in failed collaborative settlement negotiations may be
later obtained by a subsequently retained litigation attorney through formal
discovery procedures. No process is immune from abuse and even
collaborative lawyering under a Participation Agreement is not risk free if,
despite the incentive to settle, a settlement is not obtained. Nevertheless, the
potential benefit of obtaining a more satisfying outcome for the client
outweighs the risk of not obtaining value for the cost of the collaborative
lawyering process if the process fails. Moreover, as frequently occurs during
mediation, a settlement not realized at the initial sessions may be worked out
later, because the seeds have been sown early and are harvested later. The
collaborative lawyers may be recalled after the litigation has commenced,
because the clients later realize that a settled outcome is preferable to
winning or losing at trial (after sinking more costs in the litigation).
15 Id. at 3.
16 Id.
17 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) cmt. (1999).
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C. Court Intervention by Agreement Only
Neither party in a collaborative lawyering case may file a unilateral
document or paper with the court regarding the matter in dispute. If either
party deems it necessary to file any such document or paper with a court,
absent agreement, the collaborative lawyering process is deemed to have
failed, and the attorney and his firm shall be disqualified from further
representing that client. The parties agree not to use the threat of litigation or
the leverage of traditional pre-trial motion practice to try to get the upper
hand; thus to file a document unilaterally with a court, even one seeking
emergency relief, is considered a violation of the collaborative lawyering
process.
If either of the parties requires a temporary agreement-a tolling
agreement, for instance-the agreement will be put in writing and signed by
both parties. If one or both parties withdraw from the process, this temporary
agreement may be the basis for an order, which the court may make
retroactive to the date of the written agreement. And any settlement reached
through collaborative lawyering will be enforceable by a court if it becomes
necessary.
D. Termination by Written Notice
Of course, sometimes collaborative lawyering will not succeed.
However, through the Participation Agreement, the parties commit
themselves to holding on to the very end for the possibility of a resolution
without litigation. If one party wishes to terminate the process, he agrees not
to do so unilaterally without having all parties first consult with an
advisor/mediator approved by the CLC. This commitment to third party
assistance is particularly valuable. A mediator may breach an impasse in
which the most well-intentioned collaborative lawyers have found
themselves. Fortunately, collaborative lawyers may reap greater benefits
from mediation, because they are able to better serve as advocates in
mediation partnering with the mediator to reach settlement. 18 This last-
chance effort is bypassed only if both parties agree that it would be fruitless.
In the event that one party does decide to withdraw from the
collaborative law process unilaterally, he agrees to give prompt written
notice to the other side. Following withdrawal, the parties agree to a thirty-
18 James K.L. Lawrence, Mediation Advocacy: Partnering with the Mediator, 15
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RE OL. 425, 432 (2000) (examining the benefits of having the
advocate in mediation work with the mediator to develop a facilitative process,
brainstorm and evaluate options for settlement and craft a good substantive outcome).
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day waiting period (unless emergency relief is needed) before proceeding
with litigation. This gives both sides the opportunity to retain new counsel
and educate that counsel about the case. Any temporary agreements made by
the parties during the collaborative lawyering process will remain in force
during this transition period.
E. Disqualification of the Attorneys
If an attorney or law firm is disqualified and continues to represent the
client in subsequent litigation, the attorney or law firnm has breached the
Participation Agreement. Such a breach "would automatically entitle the
opposing party to enforce the [Participation Agreement] in equity or by
means of a motion to disqualify." 19 There has been no litigation to date
seeking to enforce a Participation Agreement. As a single exception, in-
house counsel is not disqualified from continuing to participate in the action,
"provided that in-house counsel shall retain outside counsel to represent the
corporation as lead counsel in such action."
20
Ill. ETHIcs AND COLLABORATIVE LAW
A. Ethical Orientation of the Collaborative Lawyer
Central to the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct is the fact that lawyers, by virtue of being lawyers, owe
specific duties to specific parties, including clients, the legal profession, and
society.21 Three of these duties are paramount: fiduciary duties, competence,
and diligence. Traditional lawyers and lawyers who serve as neutrals share a
commitment to these duties but may exercise these duties in drastically
different ways. The traditional advocate is committed first and foremost to
the interests of an individual: the client.22 By contrast, a neutral is not
retained to advance the interest of a particular individual but rather to
moderate or mediate a dispute, functioning as a sounding board off of which
the parties can bounce their own ideas and generate their own creative
solutions. 23 Projects such as the CLC invite attorneys to straddle the line
19 CLC PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT, supra note 14, at 4.
20 Id.
21 MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT pmbl. (1999).
22 Id.
23 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HOUSE OF
[Vol. 17:2 2002]
COLLABORATIVE LAWYERING
between advocacy and neutrality, placing the collaborative lawyer in a
unique ethical position. This distinctive ethical orientation of the
collaborative lawyer may be best explained by describing the divergent
responsibilities of the advocate and the neutral, in between which the
collaborative lawyer practices.
An advocate's fiduciary duty to his client sets the tone for his duties of
competence and diligence. "Fiduciary" may be defined as "a person having
duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in
matters connected with such undertaking." 24 A fiduciary must exhibit
"scrupulous good faith and candor" at all times to the person with whom he
is in a fiduciary relationship. 25 Among those who have fiduciary duties are
executors, administrators, trustees, guardians, and lawyers.26 Reflecting the
principal importance of the lawyer-advocate's fiduciary duty is Model Rule
1.2, which provides that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation.., and shall consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."27
The duties of competence and diligence are two furthet means by which
a lawyer-advocate alms to fulfill his fiduciary duty to his client. Model Rules
1.1 and 1.3 are the essential guidelines of the lawyer's duties of competence
and diligence. Model Rule 1.1 states, "a lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation." 28 Model Rule 1.3 provides, "a lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."29 The
Comment to Rule 1.3 cautions against procrastination and adds that "a
lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or
endeavor." 30 The high standard of zealous advocacy demanded by the duties
of competence and diligence ensures that the lawyer-advocate fortify his
fiduciary relationship with his client.
DELEGATES R. 2.4 (Proposed Rule, 2001), available at http:llwww.abanet.orgcpr/e2k-
reporthom.html.
24 BLACK's LAw DICrIoNARY 431 (6th ed. 1991).
25 Id.
26 Id.
2 7 MODELRULES OFPROF'LCONDUCrR. 1.2 (1999).
28 MODELRULES OFPROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.1 (1999).
29 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (1999).
30 MODELRULES OFPROF'L CONDUC R. 1.3 cmt. (1999).
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In light of the increasing use of ADR and the consequent shift in the role
lawyers are called to play, the Ethics 2000 Commission of the ABA recently
proposed the addition of Model Rule 2.4, which targets the unique
responsibility of the lawyer-neutral. The rule defines the function of a
lawyer-neutral:
A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or
more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a
dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-
party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such
other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the
matter. 31
Rule 2.4(b) then goes on to describe the specific ethical and professional
duties of a lawyer-neutral:
A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented
parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role
in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's
role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a
client.
32
The language of Rule 2.4 reveals that the Commission is concerned
about a party's perception of the lawyer-neutral's role:
Unlike nonlawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in
this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between
the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client
representative.... Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform
unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role
as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative,
including the inapplicability of the attomey-client evidentiary privilege.33
The explanation of the text stresses the magnitude of the risk of party
misunderstanding: "The potential for confusion is sufficiently great to
mandate this requirement in all cases involving unrepresented parties .... -34
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (Standards), a joint
project of the American Arbitration Association, the ABA, and the
31 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (Legislative Draft 2000).
3 2 MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4(b) (Legislative Draft 2000).
33 MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 2.4 cmt. (Legislative Draft 2000).
34 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4 cmt. (Legislative Draft 2000).
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Association for Conflict Resolution (ACR),35 are designed to serve as a
guide for the conduct of mediators, to inform the mediating parties, and to
promote public confidence in mediation as a process for resolving disputes. 36
This ethical framework aims to combat concerns similar to those that
motivated the creation of Model Rule 2.4. Two of the most notable
provisions within the Standards are those dedicated to impartiality and
quality of the mediation process.37 These provisions reflect the fiduciary duty
and duties of competence and diligence described above, but demonstrate
that the foci of these duties are quite different in the context of lawyer
neutrality.
The Standards prbvide that "[a] mediator shall mediate only those
matters in which she or he can remain impartial and evenhanded. 38
Furthermore, if at any time the mediator believes he is unable to continue the
process in an impartial manner, he must withdraw from the case.39 Thus,
competency and diligence in lawyer neutrality require complete impartiality
in all dealings with the mediating parties. This standard of impartiality differs
notably from the definition of diligence in advocacy, which requires that the
lawyer-advocate "take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to
vindicate a client's cause or endeavor."40
The Standards further define a quality process as one in which the
mediator exhibits diligence and procedural fairness.41 The Comment
following the Standards reveals the root of this requirement, stating that the
role of a mediator "differs substantially from other professional-client
relationships."42 The Comment cautions that mixing the role of a mediator
and a professional advisor is problematic, and therefore urges mediators to
strive to distinguish between the two roles.43 The Standards recommend that
a mediator should at all times refrain from providing professional advice, and
add that a mediator who at the request of the parties decides to take on an
35 Before the Academy of Family Mediators, the Conflict Resolution Education
Network, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) merged in
2000 to create ACR, the project participant was SPIDR.
3 6 AM. ARBITRATION ASW'N, MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS,
available at www.adr.org/rules/ethics/standard.htnl (last visited July 23, 2001). One
need not be a lawyer to be a mediator. One can obtain certification, depending upon state




4 0 MODFLRULES OFPROF'LCoNDuCT R. 1.3 cmt. (1999).
41 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 36.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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additional dispute resolution role in the same matter assumes increased
responsibilities and obligations that may be governed by the standards of
other processes.44 These ethical requirements are undoubtedly analogs to the
duties of the lawyer-advocate discussed above, but certainly reveal that the
means of achieving these duties in the context of lawyer neutrality are quite
different. The interests and needs of an individual client are no longer the
lawyer's sole motivation; the lawyer-neutral's chief cause is unbiased and
open-minded guidance.
The divergent loyalties of the advocate and the neutral accentuate the
unique circumstances faced by a collaborative lawyer who is also a
practicing traditional advocate. Most of the attorneys involved in the CLC
are employed by law firms or corporations, or work in private practice, and
therefore earn their living by exhibiting the utmost respect and dedication to
the needs and wishes of their clients. In the context of collaborative law, an
individual client is no longer the lawyer's sole concern in the traditional
sense. The duties of competence and diligence for the collaborative lawyer
are expanded to encompass the interests of the neutral: open-minded
counseling4 5 and creative conflict resolution. Although the collaborative
lawyer is not actually a neutral, his responsibilities shift away from those
associated with "pure" advocacy and toward the creative, flexible
representation that characterizes neutrality. A lawyer can become so
comfortable with pushing the very specific agenda of his client, and only his
client, that it can be difficult for him to shift perspectives toward a truly
creative and truly collaborative mindset. Establishing roots within this unique
ethical orientation should be a challenge every collaborative lawyer is
prepared to face.
B. Specific Ethical Considerations
While the ethical implications of collaborative lawyering continue to be
explored, the Participation Agreement has been tailored to conform to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Zealous representation requires a
lawyer to act with "commitment and dedication to the interests of the client"
and to carry to a conclusion, using "professional discretion in determining
44Id.
45 See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Building a Pedagogy of Problem-Solving:
Learning To Choose Among ADR Processes, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 113, 125 (2000)
(making a strong case for counseling along a broad spectrum of ADR options, but
omitting collaborative lawyering as one of those options).
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the means by which a. matter should be pursued," any matter undertaken on
the client's behalf.
46
Coming to the table with a mindset to settle the dispute without resort to
litigation is not inconsistent with zealous advocacy, eipecially because the
client has consented in advance to the attorney's singular pursuit of
settlement without resort to litigation or the threat of litigation. Zealousness
may be measured by utilizing the attorney's developed expertise in
negotiation and problem solving rather than litigation.
A commitment to withdrawal if settlement efforts are unsuccessful is not
inconsistent with carrying the client's interests to a conclusion. Under
Disciplinary Rule 2-1 10(C)(5), the Model Code allows permissive
withdrawal if "knowingly and freely" assented to by the client.47 For the
collaborative lawyer such assent occurs at the outset of the representation and
is contained in the Participation Agreement. 48 Further, the client knows and
consents in advance that "it will be necessary to select new attorneys and
(pay) additional fees." The parameters of the representation have been
defined, formalized and expressly agreed upon in the Participation
Agreement.
Although many of the ethical concerns raised by collaborative law are
addressed by obtaining prior written consent of the client in the Participation
Agreement, the intricacies of the process leave some ethical questions
unanswered. For instance, if the collaborative law process ends without a
settlement, the collaborative lawyer is required to withdraw from
representation of the client. The ethical rules require that a withdrawing
attorney "take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of
his client."49 In many instances, this rule will require the withdrawing
attorney not only to aid the client in finding new counsel, but to inforn the
successor counsel of the facts and circumstances that have developed in the
case. However, the terms of the Participation Agreement may limit the
46 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1999); see MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(2); see also Sholar, supra note 8, at 677-80;
Dominic G. Zerbi, Collaborative Law: Agreeing to Cooperate 29-31 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
47 See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.2(c), R. 1.16(b) (1999); Sholar,
supra note 8, at 675-77.
48 Id. Comment 4 to Model Rule 1.2(c) provides, "The objectives or scope of
services provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the
terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client.... The terms
upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific objectives or means .... "
(emphasis added); see also MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCTR. 1.16 cmt. (1999).
4 9 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1 10(A)(2); see also MODEL RULES
OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1.16(d) (1999).
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information that the collaborative lawyer can provide to new counsel and
may restrict the collaborative lawyer's ability to aid in the case's transition to
litigation. Without information and assistance from the collaborative lawyer,
the litigating attorney may not adequately be able to enforce and protect the
client's legal rights. Thus, the withdrawing attorney's obligations under the
Participation Agreement and the ethical rules may come into conflict.
Limited by the confidentiality and withdrawal provisions of the Agreement,
collaborative attorneys may not be able to fulfill their obligations to
withdraw without materially prejudicing their client's cause.
The practice of collaborative law also raises ethical issues regarding the
division of fees between the attorneys that handle different stages of the case.
As a general rule, lawyers may only split fees with other lawyers when the
client has been informed, given consent, and the split is in proportion to the
amount of work done and the responsibility assumed by each attorney.50
Avoiding improper fee splitting could be difficult in cases where, for
example, an attorney who has engaged a client on a contingent fee basis
refers the case to a collaborative lawyer who successfully settles the matter in
collaborative negotiations. In this scenario, it is unclear whether the
collaborative lawyer is entitled to the contingent fee, or, if not, by what
measure the collaborative lawyer is to be compensated. The new and
imprecise nature of collaborative practice may make it difficult to assess the
value of the services that the collaborative attorney provides. Consequently,
the strict rules governing assessment of legal fees may pose ethical problems
for collaborative lawyers.
Lawyers may also be unclear about their ethical obligations under the
terms of the Participation Agreement itself. For example, the Agreement
requires that the parties provide "good faith" answers in response to
questions from the other party. However, the Agreement does not
specifically address the parties' obligations to disclose relevant information
that has not been affirmatively requested by the other side. Nor does the
Agreement address whether collaborative lawyers have an obligation,
independent of the obligations of their clients, to disclose all relevant
information, or to otherwise act in a manner that ensures the integrity of the
collaborative process.
Finally, the Agreement cannot prevent a signatory attorney and her client
from entering the collaborative process with a pre-design for failure for the
sole purpose of removing the irksome attorney on the other side or the firn--
as well as herself and her firm--from the case. Such scheming is antithetical
to the collaborative process. At a minimum, it tars the ill-scheming attorney
50 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(1)-DR 2-107(A)(3);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e)(1)-R. 1.5(e)(3) (1999).
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with a "scarlet letter" which will harm, if not destroy, her reputation as a
lawyer worthy of trust in the future. A collaborative lawyer who has reason
to be suspicious of the motives of a lawyer with whom she is planning to
collaborate would be well-advised to have a candid discussion about her
suspicions before signing the Participation Agreement.
IV. CARVING A PATH FOR COLLABORATIVE LAW
How can the legal system account for the developing role of the
collaborative lawyer? I propose that both law schools and law firms formally
recognize the increasing convergence of the roles of advocacy and problem
solving in the legal profession.
First, and perhaps most important, law schools need to place increased
emphasis on problem solving skills.51 From day one, fledgling lawyers are
taught to advocate and persuade. Law school exams, moot court and trial
team competitions, and the question-and-answer cycle that defines the
Socratic method in the law school classroom all require that a student learn to
pick a point and argue it persuasively until the end. The first year law student
quickly learns that success in law school depends on being a competitive
advocate-whether in the classroom, on paper, or in extracurricular
activities. If law schools were to provide more opportunities for students to
feel comfortable with and actually to admire problem solving, students would
learn to appreciate its unique features and feel comfortable with its distinct
ethical responsibilities. This could be in the form of mandatory courses in
ADR for first year students, or simply a wider variety of courses for upper-
level students to study ADR, including clinics and seminars on creative
counseling, problem solving and ADR options, including collaborative
lawyering.5
2
51 While many law schools have improved the instruction they offer in ADR, the
majority of courses and clinics focus on traditional advocacy issues and techniques. See
Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR Education: The Promise of Our Future, DISP. RESOL. J.,
Apr.-Sept. 1996, at 56, 58-59; see generally Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires
New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective Representation in a
Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J 935
(2001) (examining the differences in the roles of lawyer as advocate, versus lawyer as
mediator).
52See Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as
Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1996) (stating that
the American legal education is "weak" in teaching practical skills such as dispute
resolution techniques). See generally AM. BAR ASs'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CoNTINUUM 138-51, 185-90, 242-45
(1992) (discussing problem-solving techniques, such as negotiation).
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Second, many law firms subsume their ADR practice within the practice
of various departments. By contrast, a growing number of firms have distinct
ADR practice groups. One such firm is Kaufman and Canoles in Norfolk,
Virginia, which describes the reason for establishing a separate ADR practice
group:
In order to be competitive themselves, providers of legal and other
professional services must respond to [the] need of their business clients [to
find cheaper and faster ways to do business]. One way [we] are meeting this
challenge is by providing state of the art advice to clients on alternative
dispute resolution.
53
This reasoning demonstrates the firm's commitment to treat ADR as its own
discipline. The creation of distinct ADR practice groups-which could, of
course, be composed of interested and qualified members of other practice
groups-would be a means for full-service law firms to acknowledge and
actively integrate the reality of ADR into their legal practice. Those lawyers
who identify themselves as ADR attomeys-and not simply as advocates
who at times resort to ADR-will come to appreciate the features that
distinguish ADR-and particularly collaborative lawyering-from other
forms of law practice, particularly ethical duties. Establishing an ADR
practice group will also encourage other attorneys within the firm who rarely
utilize ADR to make the same distinction in their own minds.
Third, law firms could require that all attorneys in any practice group
who utilize ADR to any extent in their practice periodically attend a seminar
or Continuing Legal Education program on ethics in collaborative problem-
solving. This would serve to highlight the ethical and professional
differences between advocacy and problem solving, which their attorneys
might not otherwise consider. While the differences are clear when they are
analyzed in an article such as this one, they may not be so obvious to legal
practitioners who get caught up in the routine of day-to-day practice without
thinking more seriously about the varying roles they play as modem lawyers.
53 Kaufman & Canoles, Practice Areas, available at
http://www.kaufcan.comIPracticeDetail.asp?PACode=2 (last visited July 23, 2001); see
also Robert E. Meade, Circuit City: Green Light for Employee Arbitration Plans?, THE
ADR ADvISOR, Summer 2001, at 1, available at
http://www.stradley.com/admin/Resources/resacrobat/20010817112245 FILE_NAME.
pdf (newsletter of Stradley Ronan Stevens & Young, LLP; the newsletter is devoted to




Finally, lawyers, judges, and academics committed to problem-solving 54
could ascend the dais and educate the bar and potential disputants about the
benefits of early settlement initiatives, including collaborative lawyering.
Speeches and discussion groups are opportunities to sow the value-seeds of
collaborative negotiation and resolution of disputes without resort to
expensive litigation to a public craving such knowledge. Fears that attorney
fees will be duplicative and will necessarily increase, that the other side will
necessarily take advantage of our openness and disclosure of information or
that the other side will not negotiate in good faith will be reduced and put
into a broader and more useful context through public dialogue.55
V. CONCLUSION
Alternative dispute resolution is not a new idea. Many jurisdictions
require cases to go to a mediator before a judge will hear them. But for ADR
to be successful in any guise, it must be practiced by lawyers and clients,
who are convinced not just of the merits of their case, but of the merits of
finding a successful resolution to a dispute without formal (and expensive)
litigation. Collaborative lawyering can only be successful when the parties in
dispute, and their attorneys, have changed their minds about the process, and
about the definition of success. The process can be civil-and the outcome
positive-if both sides in the dispute validate the legitimacy and rationality
of the other, and if both sides recognize that when the dispute is resolved,
they can both be better off than either would have been in litigation.
Collaborative lawyering will not work for every case. But it can work for
many. It is an experiment in problem-solving that should be endorsed by
lawyers who take pride in caring about the broader business and personal
interests of their clients. Critics will say that the lawyer is taking a significant
risk of lost litigation fees and a client lost to a litigation firm. It is, however,
the client whom we zealously serve, and it is the client who may significantly
benefit from a creative settlement through collaborative lawyering. A
54 William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 367, 374, 389 (1999). Coyne presages use of settlement counsel as a giant step
toward collaborative lawyering, "The attorney is paid to explore settlement, knowing that
another attorney will handle the case if efforts to reach a negotiated solution are
unsuccessful." Id. at 392.
55 Id. at 408-12. Coyne's cost-benefit analysis for use of separate settlement counsel
nearly mirrors the reasons for using collaborative lawyers. On using separate settlement
counsel, Roger Fisher is often credited with advancing the idea. See Roger Fisher, He
Who Pays the Piper, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 150, 155-57.
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negotiator-and collaborative problem-solver-is successful "not by having
a path through the woods but in knowing the terrain. ' '56
56 With appreciation to Professor Roger Fisher, Samuel Williston Professor of Law,
Emeritus, and Director Emeritus of The Harvard Negotiation Project, paraphrased from
Videotape: The Hackerstar Negotiation (Harvard Negotiation Project 1985) (on file with
the Program on Negotiation at the Harvard Law School).
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